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Id 2398
Author Jia F.; Wang D.-D.; Li L.
Title The stochastic evolutionary game analysis of public prevention and control strategies in public health emergencies

Jia F.; Wang D.-D.; Li L. The stochastic evolutionary game analysis of public prevention and control strategies in public health emergencies,Kybernetes

Keywords Cost benefit analysis; Decision making; Disease control; Game theory; Public health; Stochastic models; Wear of materials; Control strategies; Evolutionary games; Health emergencies; Moran process; Prevention and controls; Prevention strategies; Public health emergency; Public prevention and control strategy; Stochastic evolutionary game; Stochastics; Stochastic systems
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Abstract Purpose: The COVID-19 epidemic is still spreading globally and will not be completely over in a short time. Wearing a mask is an effective means to combat the spread of COVID-19. However, whether the public wear a mask for epidemic prevention and control will be affected by stochastic factors such as vaccination, cultural differences and irrational emotions, which bring a high degree of uncertainty to the prevention and control of the epidemic. The purpose of this study is to explore and analyze the epidemic prevention and control strategies of the public in an uncertain environment. Design/methodology/approach: Based on the stochastic evolutionary game model of the Moran process, the study discusses the epidemic prevention and control strategies of the public under the conditions of the dominance of stochastic factors, expected benefits and super-expected benefits. Findings: The research shows that the strategic evolution of the public mainly depends on stochastic factors, cost-benefit and the number of the public. When the stochastic factors are dominant, the greater the perceived benefit, the lower the cost and the greater the penalty for not wearing masks, the public will choose to wear a mask. Under the dominance of expected benefits and super-expected benefits, when the number of the public is greater than a certain threshold, the mask-wearing strategy will become an evolutionary stable strategy. From the evolutionary process, the government’s punishment measures will slow down the speed of the public choosing the strategy of not wearing masks. The speed of the public evolving to the stable strategy under the dominance of super-expected benefits is faster than that under the dominance of expected benefits. Practical implications: The study considers the impact of stochastic factors on public prevention and control strategies and provides decision-making support and theoretical guidance for the scientific prevention of the normalized public. Originality/value: To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no research has considered the impact of different stochastic interference intensities on public prevention and control strategies. Therefore, this paper can be seen as a valuable resource in this field. © 2022, Emerald Publishing Limited.


DOI 10.1108/K-10-2021-0988
Search Database Scopus
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