Analyze article and determine cultural category
Id : | 2415 | |
Author : | Zhang M.; Yao P. | |
Title | Study on the evolutionary game of the three parties in the combined medical and health-care PPP project |
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Reference : | Zhang M.; Yao P. Study on the evolutionary game of the three parties in the combined medical and health-care PPP project,Frontiers in Public Health 11 |
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Link to article | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85147713657&doi=10.3389%2ffpubh.2023.1072354&partnerID=40&md5=123e282348ba25fc074cd935e63a0d31 |
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Abstract | In the context of ageing, the combination of medical and health-care has become a major trend, and the introduction of the PPP model into combined medical and healthcare projects can solve the problem of lack of funds for the development of combined medical and health-care projects. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model to study the strategy choice of each party in the game process, and also analyses the evolutionary equilibrium strategy and the impact of parameter adjustment on the evolutionary strategy under different situations. The results show that the optimal solution is for the private sector to choose to provide high quality services, for the government to choose to actively regulate and for the public to choose to actively monitor. For each player, the incentives and disincentives influence their behavioural strategies. Based on the above analysis, this paper suggests establishing an independent regulator, broadening public feedback channels, and improving PPP-related laws, as well as innovating project operation methods and improving enterprise operational capabilities. Copyright © 2023 Zhang and Yao. |
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Certainity |
Heritage | 0.0000 |
Archives | 0.0000 |
Libraries | 0.0000 |
Book and Press | 0.0000 |
Visual Arts | 0.0000 |
Performing Arts | 0.0001 |
Audiovisual and Multimedia | 0.9998 |
Architecture | 0.0000 |
Adverstizing | 0.0000 |
Art crafts | 0.0000 |
General cultural dimension | 0.0000 |